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EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS-ADMISSIBILITY OF A SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION

DoCTRINE--Defendant was indicted for first
degree murder and convicted of manslaughter in the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia. Defendant had willingly directed
the police to the victim's body and voluntarily signed a written confession
during a period of thirty-four hours detention prior to arraignment. At
the arraignment defendant was informed of his rights and indicated that
he was aware of them; in addition, the preliminary hearing was postponed
in order to provide him opportunity to obtain counsel. Twenty hours
after his arraignment the defendant once again voluntarily confessed while
giving a police officer instructions as to the disposition of the victim's body.
At the trial the first confession was excluded because it was made during a
period of illegal detention; 1 however, the second confession was admitted
as evidence upon a finding by the judge that it was voluntary and independent of the first one. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded for
a new trial.2 A subsequent confession, obtained soon after the rendition of
UNDER. THE McNABB-MALLORY

R. CruM:. P. 5(a).
court sitting en bane was split, with four judges dissenting, and one judge
concurring with the majority for the reasons stated in the majority opinion and for
the additional reasons stated in his own concurring opinion. Principal case at 248.
1 FED.
2 The
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an inadmissible confession, and before the defendant has the aid of counsel,
is inadmissible. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Two exclusionary doctrines are applied in the federal courts to render
confessions inadmissible. On the one hand, confessions induced by coercive
methods are excluded because their admission constitutes a violation of due
process of law. The underlying rationale for holding coerced confessions
inadmissible has been that confessions so obtained are involuntary and unreliable; however, these two conditions are not of equivalent significance,
as confessions made involuntarily are inadmissible even though their accuracy can be independently substantiated.3 Initially, the coerced confession
doctrine excluded only those confessions obtained by force, threat of force,
or a promise of leniency,4 but recently it has been extended to include
prolonged questioning as a ground for exclusion where the pressure was
only psychological rather than physical.5 In contrast to the constitutional
invalidation of coerced confessions is the exclusionary rule, applicable only
in federal courts, 6 based upon Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which requires that after arrest the accused must be taken before a commissioner for arraignment "without unnecessary delay." In a
series of decisions, primarily McNabb,1 Upshaw, 8 and Mallory, 9 the Supreme Court has formulated this doctrine which, in effect, renders inadmissible any confession obtained while the defendant was being detained
in violation of Rule 5(a).10 Although some federal courts have suggested
the likelihood that extended detention will result in coercive police
methods,11 the rule itself is not based on constitutional grounds; 12 indeed,
no inquiry is made as to the existence of coercion once "unnecessary delay"
8 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 111, at 232 (1954). Reliability of a confession is immaterial;
it must be voluntary and not be induced by unfair police measures. Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1951); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
4 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Unfair police methods sufficient for exclusion are: the fear of mob violence, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); threats
of bodily harm, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 406 (1945); use of physical force,
e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); pressures of bargains for leniency, e.g.,
Crawford v. United States, 219 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1955).
IS Physical harm or threat of violence is not a necessity for finding the confession
involuntary. See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1956). For the general development
of these standards, see Maguire, "Involuntary" Confessions, 31 TuL. L. REv. 125 (1956);
Comment, 27 FORDHAM L. REv. 396 (1958).
6 But see People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
7 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
s Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
9 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
10 The Supreme Court has the power to formulate rules of evidence applicable to
the administration of federal criminal trials. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (Supp. III, 1961). See Wolfe
v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
11 Unlawful detention was thought to give the police the opportunity to apply unfair pressure before the defendant had the benefit of being informed of his rights by
the commissioner. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 45 (1951).
12 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 476 (1953); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S.
65, 68 (1944); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
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has been shown.13 Instead, the McNabb-Mallory doctrine is a rule of per
se inadmissibility designed primarily to deter federal officers from using
pre-arraignment detention as an investigative device.14
Subsequent confessions, following a coerced confession, are not necessarily inadmissible. Admission of the subsequent confession into evidence
is conditioned on a showing that it was voluntary and independent of the
earlier coerced confession. 15 Among the factors considered by the courts in
determining the voluntariness and independence of a subsequent confession, the following appear to be the most significant: the elapsed time between the two confessions,16 the role of the authorities in inducing the
second confession,17 the degree of spontaneity displayed in making the
second confession, 18 and the existence of an opportunity to consult with
counsel.19 The rationale for the application of these particular factors
seems to be coincident with the rationale for the exclusion of the initial
confession, in that these factors are designed to test whether elements of
coercion which induced the first confession contributed to the rendition
of the subsequent admission of guilt.
Generally, the federal courts seem to analyze the circumstances of a
subsequent confession in the same manner whether the original confession was actually coerced or simply inadmissible under the McNabbMallory doctrine. Three illegal detention cases decided prior to the principal case dealt with subsequent confessions. In the first, United States v.
Bayer,20 the Supreme Court upheld the admission of a second confession
made six months after an inadmissible confession was obtained. Although
the Court recognized the psychological pressure on a defendant once he
has let the "cat out of the bag," it concluded that the making of a confession under circumstances which precludes its introduction into evidence
will not perpetually disable the confessor from making an admissible declaration of guilt after the conditions invalidating the earlier confession
13 "[A] confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to failure
promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is the result of torture, physical or psychological .•. .' " Upshaw v. United States,
335 U.S. at 413.
14 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943). This requirement of a prompt
hearing has been codified in Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;
however, pre-arraignment confessions made during necessary delays have been held admissible. See Porter v. United States, 258 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
906 (1959) (commissioner unavailable, office closed for the night); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957) (dictum) (delay to check and verify defendant's story).
15 McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 3, § 114. See Watts v. United States, 278 F.2d 247
(D.C. Cir. 1960).
16 United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1948); cf. United States
v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 541 (1947).
17 See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604-05 (1944).
18 See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191 (1952); Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra
note 17, at 604-05.
19 United States v. Morin, 265 F.2d 241, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1959).
20 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
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are removed.21 The other two cases, Goldsmith v. United States22 and
Jackson v. United States,23 were recently decided by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, as was the principal case. In Goldsmith the
defendants affirmed the barred confession upon return from the preliminary hearing in a colloquy with one of the persons robbed. This oral confession was admitted on the basis that it was voluntary and not the fruit
of the original confession.24 And in Jackson the defendant orally informed
the police officers, after being advised of his rights by the magistrate, that
his inadmissible written confession was true. The admission of this oral
affirmation of the inadmissible confession was upheld, because it had been
rendered by the defendant after the preliminary hearing and receipt of
judicial cautioning.25 In each of the three cases the court considered the
circumstances of the later confession to determine whether it was voluntary
and independent of the earlier inadmissible confession.
Although the basis for the decision in the principal case is not clearly
stated, the approach seemingly taken by the court was, once again, to make
a determination of whether the second confession was voluntary and independent. The court distinguished Goldsmith and Jackson by construing
them as requiring that the accused actually have the advice of counsel
before the subsequent confession was made,26 thus suggesting that the
advice of counsel in the interim between confessions is indispensable to
the admission of a subsequent confession. This requirement of counsel,
coupled with the majority's disregard for the trial judge's determination
that the subsequent confession was voluntary and independent, lends
credence to the argument that the principal case does not follow the accepted procedure of considering all the circumstances of the second confession. Although such a construction is possible, the fact that the court
distinguishes, rather than overrules, Jackson and Goldsmith 21 seems to
lead to the conclusion that the court did not refute the accepted test,
but merely re-examined the facts, giving great weight to the absence of
counsel, and found that the second confession was not voluntary and independent.
Either interpretation of the holding in the principal case suggests that
essentially the same test will be applied whether the subsequent confession
follows an earlier coerced confession or one that is inadmissible under the
McNabb-Mallory rule, without any importance being attached to the
difference in the principles underlying those two doctrines. "What appears
Id. at 541. See Note, 70 YALE L.J. 298 (1960).
277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1961).
285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 941 (1961).
Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 863 (1961), 74 HA.RV. L. REv. 1222.
25 Jackson v. United States, 285 F.2d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
941 (1961), 47 VA. L. REv. 888.
26 Principal case at 243.
21 Ibid.
21
22
23
24

1368

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

to be needed is a clear statement of the thrust and extent of the McNabbMallory rule as applied to subsequent confessions. The admissibility of
such subsequent confessions should not depend on their being voluntary
and independent of the first confession, as in the case of confessions subsequent to earlier coerced confessions, but should be founded on the rationale underlying the McNabb-Mallory rule. Ostensibly, confessions
obtained during a period of illegal detention are not regarded as being
coerced; the exclusionary rule is directed at police procedures rather than
at the effects of police procedures, thus serving general administrative
purposes rather than the protection of constitutional rights.28 This distinction is significant, because it is the presence of coercion in the first
confession which makes the determination of the voluntariness and independence of the subsequent confession relevant. When the initial confession is coerced the court must consider the effect that the coercion had
on the defendant thereafter. Illustratively, if the subsequent confession
was induced by fear of the continuation of past coercion, due process protection should be extended to prevent introduction into evidence of the
later admission. However, there can be no continuation of illegal detention after the defendant has been arraigned. Thus, the only remaining
rationale for using the "voluntary and independent" test in the McNabbMallory subsequent confession cases is that the accused, having confessed
once, suffers a psychological disadvantage because he has let "the cat out
of the bag." 29 Although this reasoning has some merit, it is unlikely to
prevail in view of the fact that the Supreme Court, in Bayer, upheld the
admissibility of a subsequent confession despite this consideration. Moreover, if the earlier confession was voluntary, and inadmissible only because
of the illegal detention, the argument that the accused's will to remain
silent has been broken seems spurious.30 Hence, the admissibility of a confession subsequent to an earlier uncoerced confession, which is inadmissible
only because of the McNabb-Mallory rule, should be determined by the
same test which is applied to any confession not within the scope of the
McNabb-Mallory rule.
If the "voluntary and independent" standard is deemed to be inappropriate in the McNabb-Mallory doctrine area, two additional problems are
raised. First, what should be done about subsequent confessions when the
the first confession was obtained by coercive methods during an illegal
detention? Coerced confessions which are obtained during a period of
illegal detention should be treated the same as any other coerced confession.
If the confession made during illegal detention was coerced, then the
circumstances of a confession made after arraignment should be considered
28 Hogan &: Snee, McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale b Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J.
1, 7, 29 (1958).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
so See People v. Jones, 24 Cal. 2d 601, 609, 150 P.2d 801, 805 (1944); Flamme v. State,
171 Wis. 501, 506, 177 N.W. 596, 598 (1920).
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to determine whether it was voluntary and independent; however, if the
earlier confession was inadmissible only because of an illegal delay, the
subsequent confession should not be affected. Secondly, what force remains
in the McNabb-Mallory rule if subsequent confessions are admitted without making a finding of voluntariness and independence? In light of the
limited number of cases where this problem has arisen, and the fact that
delay in itself might be deemed coercive, a significant circumvention of
the rule would probably not result. On the other hand, even if the suggested approach does result in a weakening of the rule, the McNabbMallory doctrine is not the only means of enforcing Rule 5(a). In fact,
if the burden of showing that coercion did not exist during the illegal
detention were placed on the Government, the result, in most cases, would
not be different from that achieved under existing law. Consistent with this
analysis of the admissibility of confessions subsequent to a confession
barred under the McNabb-Mallory rule, the principal case should still
be reversed and remanded, but before the subsequent confession is barred
it should be determined whether coercion existed during the illegal
detention. The implementation of such an approach for the consideration of all subsequent confessions establishes a uniform rule for all coerced
confessions, but avoids an illogical extension of the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine.
ha]. Jaffe, S.Ed.

